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A QUEST TO INCREASE WOMEN IN CORPORATE 
BOARD LEADERSHIP: COMPARING THE LAW IN 
NORWAY AND THE U.S. 
Angela R. Foster † 
Abstract: Gender imbalance is a persistent problem on corporate boards the 
world over.  Women are severely underrepresented in these important leadership 
positions within public companies.  Norway took a big swing at inequality in 2003 by 
enacting a quota law requiring at least 40% representation of each gender on boards of 
directors of public companies.  Norway now has the highest percentage of women 
serving on corporate boards.  Through Securities and Exchange Commission regulations, 
the United States enacted a diversity disclosure rule that requires public companies to 
divulge their policy regarding gender in board hiring.  The disclosure rule has proven 
ineffectual, and at the current rate of change, it will take 70 years for women to gain 
equal seats on U.S. corporate boards.  
Many stereotypes about women in the workplace persist, making it difficult for 
women to climb to the top of the corporate hierarchy.  A closer look at the barriers to 
women’s success reveals that advocates of gender equality on corporate boards may need 
to change tactics in the U.S. and advocate for stronger government intervention in the 
private sphere in order to achieve change more quickly.  Short of imposing a quota, 
which is highly unlikely in the United States, what can advocates learn from the 
advancements made in Norway?  
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PERSISTENT PROBLEM OF GENDER IMBALANCE ON 
CORPORATE BOARDS 
Women, worldwide, are severely underrepresented on corporate 
boards of directors.  Women hold only 12% of board seats globally, and only 
4% of companies are chaired by women.1  Nearly one-fifth of the world’s 
200 largest companies have no woman directors at all.2  Around the globe, 
                                          
† The author would like to thank Professor Melissa Durkee for her time, wisdom, and insight.  
1  Press Release, Deloitte, Women joining but not leading boardrooms globally (June 10, 2015) 
(https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/about-deloitte/articles/women-joining-not-leading-
boardrooms-press-release.html#); see also DELOITTE, WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM: A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE (4th ed. 2015), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Risk/gx-
ccg-women-in-the-board room-a-global-perspective4.pdf. 
2  BIZ DIVAS & KHAITAN & CO., WOMEN ON BOARDS: A POLICY, PROCESS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
ROADMAP 2 (2014), http://bizdivas.in/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/women_on_boardV3-PRINT.pdf. 
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corporate boards lack gender diversity, with the exception of those countries 
that have mandated gender quotas.3  
The question of who gets appointed to boards of directors of publicly 
traded corporations is an important one because boards affect the lives of 
millions of employees and consumers.4  Boards shape companies’ financial 
and operational policies, and as recent history has shown, scandal or poor 
judgment on boards of directors at large companies can have enormous costs 
for the global economy and society at large.5  In addition to being highly 
influential, board positions are among the most highly paid and prestigious 
positions in the business world.6  
 In the United States, recent studies indicate that although gender 
diversity has increased a small amount on public company boards, directors 
do not reflect the demographics of the U.S. population or the labor force.7  
Similarly, in the United States 19.2% of corporate board seats are held by 
women.8  At current rates of change in the U.S., it will take almost seventy 
years before women’s representation on corporate boards is equal with 
men’s.9 
In contrast, Norway, Sweden, and Finland all have quota laws and 
have the highest percentages of women on boards at 40.9%, 27% and 26.8% 
respectively.10  As of 2013, women held only 13.7% of board seats in the 
                                          
3  Deborah L. Rhode & Amanda K. Packel, Diversity On Corporate Boards: How Much Difference 
Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 379 (2014). 
4  Id. at 378. 
5  Id.  
6  Angelo Young, India Women’s Rights: Nearly A Third of India’s Big Companies Could Miss 
Deadline To Appoint Women To Corporate Boards, INT’L BUS. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2015, 
http://www.ibtimes.com/india-womens-rights-nearly-third-indias-big-companies-could-miss-deadline-
appoint-1848206; Seletha R. Butler, “Financial Expert”: A Subtle Blow to the Pool and Current Pipeline 
of Women on Corporate Boards, 14 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 20 (2013) [hereinafter, Butler, Financial 
Expert]. 
7  Regina F. Burch, Worldview Diversity in the Boardroom: A Law and Social Equity Rationale, 42 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 585, 597 (2011). 
8  Catalyst Inc., 2014 Catalyst Census: Women Board Directors, 1, 1 (2014), 
http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/2014-catalyst-census-women-board-directors [hereinafter 2014 Catalyst 
Census].  
9  Rhode & Packel, supra note 3 at 381. 
10  AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE LAW, GOVERNANCE, 
AND DIVERSITY 3 (2015).   
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largest publicly listed companies in the European Union, which itself does 
not impose any quota requirement.11   
The current worldwide gender disparity on boards of directors 
indicates that the most respected and high-paying positions in the corporate 
world are not open to women.  Attention to gender equality in the workplace 
and on boards is important because work is the avenue by which men and 
women alike attain the most basic necessities they need to live.12  Gender 
biases that systematically disadvantage women permeate corporate culture, 
reducing women’s access to sustaining and meaningful work. 13   The 
availability of meaningful, fairly compensated work, or lack thereof, has 
broad impacts, influencing whether women are educated, where and with 
whom they live, whether they have children, or whether they work at all.14  
Equality for women means having at least “as much” structural access to 
power as the dominant group has.15   
As women struggle for equal representation in corporate workplaces, 
the private sector has consistently fought the idea that governments have an 
affirmative duty to promote gender equality on boards of directors.  The role 
of the state in helping to equalize opportunities in private spheres such as the 
workplace is greatly debated. 
Government intervention strategies can range from “weak” to 
“radical.”16  In working to increase gender diversity on boards of directors in 
publicly traded companies governments have used a range of strategies from 
“comply and explain” disclosure requirements (as seen in the U.S.) to strict 
                                          
11  Fawn Lee, Note, Show Me The Money: Using the Business Case Rationale to Justify Gender 
Targets in the EU, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1471, 1473 (2013). 
12  Meredith Render, The Man, The State and You: The Role of the State in Regulating Gender 
Hierarchies, 14 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 73, 108 (2006). 
13  Id. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. at 104. 
16  Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55, 71 
(2009) (characterizing Norway’s intervention into the private sector by way of the quota law as “radical” 
and characterizing more moderate intervention as “soft.” Here I have used “weak”). 
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quota systems (as seen in Norway). 17   The United States exemplifies a 
“weak,” disclosure-based intervention style while Norway has adopted a 
“radical” intervention strategy, requiring that corporate boards of public 
companies maintain near gender parity on their boards or risk dissolution.18  
This comment provides an overview of American and Norwegian 
laws regarding diversity on boards of directors and discusses ways that 
Norway’s successful quota law might influence the policy discourse in the 
United States.  Part II of this paper looks to scholarship from the corporate 
business sector and the social sciences to provide an in-depth discussion of 
the barriers to entry that women face in entering corporate leadership, 
including the many ways that gender discrimination is institutionalized 
within the business sector’s policies and procedures.  Part III will discuss the 
social political climate that has led to weak regulatory intervention in the 
United States through a disclosure-based board diversity rule.  Part IV will 
discuss the quota law in Norway and some of the social and political aspects 
of Norwegian society that led to this radical but effective government 
intervention.  Lastly, this Comment will discuss lessons that American 
advocates of gender equality on boards can take from Norway’s successful 
transition to near-gender parity on public boards of directors.  
II. BARRIERS TO ENTRY 
The continued disparity between the percentage of women in the 
workforce and their low representation on boards of directors indicates that 
women are experiencing significant barriers that are keeping them from 
advancing. 19  Additionally, the mere passage of time will not eliminate these 
barriers.20  A variety of unseen factors are impeding the upward mobility of 
women in corporations, such as lack of mentorship, role models, and 
sponsors; pay disparities that make it less worthwhile for women to work in 
                                          
17  Douglas M. Branson, Initiatives to Place Women on Corporate Boards of Directors—A Global 
Snapshot, 37 J. CORP. L. 793, 802–03 (2012); Deborah L. Rhode and Amanda K. Packel, Diversity On 
Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference Make?, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 418 (2014). 
18  See Rosenblum, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 71–72. 
19  Lisa M. Fairfax, Women and the “New” Corporate Governance: Clogs in the Pipeline, The Mixed 
Data on Women Directors and Continued Barriers to Their Advancement, 65 MD. L. REV. 579, 580 (2006). 
20  Id. 
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high demand and highly demanding positions; and an unwillingness among 
managers to give women responsibility commensurate with their male 
colleagues.21  
Board appointments may be influenced by overt racism and sexism, 
but unconscious biases are more common.22  While overt discrimination is 
less common than it used to be, discrimination continues as a result of 
institutions in the workplace, including “corporate culture, informal norms, 
networking, training, mentoring and evaluation.”23   
A survey of the relevant literature shows that the most common 
barriers to women’s advancement in corporate leadership are, (A) in-group 
bias that causes current leaders to promote subordinates who they perceive 
to be like them, (B) androcentric values in the workplace and negative 
assumptions about women’s competence, (C) lack of access to corporate 
management and executive-level leadership experience, and (D) continued 
reliance on the prevalent but ineffectual “business case” argument. 
A. In-Group Bias Among Current Corporate Board Members 
Causes Boards Not to Seriously Consider Woman Candidates 
One barrier to entry for women is “in-group” bias, which is the 
preference that individuals feel for others who are like them in important 
respects such as race, ethnicity, and gender.24  In-group bias is particularly 
demonstrated by groups that enjoy social privilege25 and in settings where 
selections are highly subjective, such as board appointments.26  Furthermore, 
in-group bias often keeps women out of the informal networks of mentorship 
                                          
21  DHIR, supra note 10, at 29; Render, supra note 12, at 74. 
22  DHIR, supra note 10, at 54. 
23  Render, supra note 12, at 89 (using the term “second generation” discrimination to describe the 
less overt forms of workplace discrimination that are more common in the modern workplace) (quoting 
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal 
Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 420 (2004)). 
24  Rhode & Packel, supra note 3, at 404; see also McKinsey & Co., Women Matter, 17 (2012), 
https://www.mckinsey.de/files/mckinsey_women_matter_2012.pdf (stating that people “feel more 
comfortable promoting those who behave and think most like themselves—in other words, men—and fail 
to appreciate different leadership styles”). 
25  See DHIR, supra note 10, at 50–51. 
26  Rhode & Packel, supra note 3, at 405. 
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that can lead to board appointments. 27   Board members tend to choose 
candidates who are within the board nominating committee’s or company 
CEO’s “circle of acquaintance,” and those committees and 
acquaintanceships do not include many qualified women.28  For example, 
one executive at a large European corporation told researchers that he 
believed people within his company felt “the top jobs somehow belonged to 
men.”29   
The supposed lack of qualified woman candidates for board positions 
is actually a problem of implicit cognitive biases coupled with the fact that 
the networks of existing directors are limited and impede entry of 
outsiders.30  It is illustrative, for example, that male and female directors 
explain the lack of women on corporate boards differently.31  Men tend to 
attribute the gender imbalance to a “pool problem,” citing lack of women in 
executive-level positions as the reason that fewer women are on boards.32  
On the other hand, women directors are more likely to explain the lack of 
female directors as a function of established male networks and the influence 
of those informal networks on board appointments.33 
The board nomination process can be particularly “clubby” with all-
male executive committees or male CEOs looking to nominate friends and 
associates who are also predominately male.34  For this reason, getting more 
women into entry-level and middle management-level positions alone will 
not necessarily get them into the most competitive leadership positions—
men in power still overlook capable women because they are looking for 
candidates who look like them.35   
                                          
27  Id.  
28  Burch, supra note 7, at 601. 
29  McKinsey & Co., supra note 24, at 17. 
30  DHIR, supra note 10, at 10.   
31  Id. at 38. 
32  Id. 
33  Id. 
34  Tamara S. Smallman, Note, The Glass Boardroom: The SEC’s Role In Cracking The Door Open 
So Women May Enter, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 801, 808 (2013). 
35  McKinsey & Co., supra note 24, at 19. 
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In-group bias continues to negatively impact women even if they 
succeed in making it to the top.  For example, in one study, almost half of 
female respondents who held upper management positions in Fortune 1000 
companies reported exclusion from informal networks of communication 
while only about 20 percent of male respondents cited such exclusion.36   
Proactive companies can combat the effects of in-group bias.  For 
instance, one diversified European company studied by McKinsey & Co. 
uses a strategy to increase gender diversity on its board wherein the 
company leadership devotes an entire session in its succession planning 
process to discussing only female candidates.37  The goal of the strategy is to 
force the leadership to consider high-performing women and to develop an 
environment in which women can contribute and succeed “rather than 
coming up with reasons why it will be hard for them to do so.”38 
B. Androcentric Values in the Workplace and Negative 
Assumptions About Women’s Competence Stall Women’s 
Professional Advancement 
Androcentrism is the institutionalized pattern of cultural value that 
privileges traits associated with masculinity, while devaluing feminine 
traits. 39   Pervasively institutionalized through law, policy, and standard 
professional practices, androcentric value patterns “structure broad swaths of 
social interaction,”40 including the private business sector.  Institutionalized 
androcentrism causes women to suffer gender-specific forms of “status 
subordination,” including “sexual harassment, sexual assault, and domestic 
violence; trivializing, objectifying, and demeaning stereotypical depictions 
in the media; disparagement in everyday life; exclusion or marginalization in 
public spheres and deliberative bodies; and denial of the full rights of equal 
                                          
36  Katherine Giscombe, Women in Corporate Leadership: Status and Prospects, in WOMEN AND 
LEADERSHIP: THE STATE OF PLAY AND STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE 383, 389 (Barbara Kellerman & Deborah 
L. Rhode eds., 2007). 
37  McKinsey & Co., supra note 24, at 19. 
38  Id. 
39  NANCY FRASER, FORTUNES OF FEMINISM: FROM STATE-MANAGED CAPITALISM TO NEOLIBERAL 
CRISIS 162 (2013). 
40  Id. 
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protection and citizenship.”41  Some forms of status subordination, such as 
sexual harassment, trivialization, or stereotypical depictions, are common 
within the workplace.42   
Corporate culture and practices assume that women are less capable 
and that their work is less valuable.  Historically, gender has been an 
underlying organizing principle of the division of labor—defining who 
performs paid “productive” and unpaid “reproductive” labor.43  A division 
within paid labor also occurred along gendered lines: historically, higher 
paid professions, such as manufacturing and professional occupations like 
lawyering or business have been reserved exclusively for men while lower 
paying domestic or service occupations have been filled by women.44  
Women’s labor is still consistently undervalued.  In fact, a recent 
study shows that when women move into occupations formerly dominated 
by men, those jobs begin to pay less.45  Another recent study, conducted by 
American and British researchers analyzing data regarding 4,600 Australian 
workers from more than 800 employers showed that men and women asked 
for pay increases at the same rate.46  A lack of assertiveness in negotiating 
for higher pay is often cited as a reason that women make less money than 
men for similar work.  This theory “‘places some of the responsibility for the 
existence of gender differentials upon female employees and the choices 
they make,’ rather than structural biases.”47  These findings directly refute 
that theory and show that there is an element of gender bias working against 
women.48  These results occur because employers place a lower value on 
work done by women. 49  The lasting legacy of gender as an organizing 
                                          
41  Id. at 162–63. 
42  Id. 
43  Id. at 162. 
44  Id. 
45  Claire Cain Miller, As Women Take Over a Male-Dominated Field, the Pay Drops, N.Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/upshot/as-women-take-over-a-male-dominated-field-
the-pay-drops.html?_r=0. 
46  Jamiles Lartey, Women ask for pay increases as often as men but receive them less, study says, 
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 5, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/05/gender-wage-gap-
women-pay-raise-men-study. 
47  Id. 
48  Id. 
49  Miller, supra note 45. 
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principal in employment lingers, and the result is a continuing economic 
structure that generates gender-specific forms of distributive economic 
injustice.50   
Within the context of high-paid professions, such as business 
management, men are often presumed to be competent, and women 
conversely are often presumed to be incompetent.51  This presumption of 
male competence or natural male leadership ability is institutionalized 
through management literature, which implicitly links men and masculinity 
with leadership and authority. 52   Because of the androcentric workplace 
values that privilege masculinity and result in bias that women are less 
competent, women have to work harder to achieve the same recognition.53  
For example, in one Harvard Business School experiment, MBA students 
were given two case studies, which were identical except that in one the 
CEO was named John and in the other the CEO was named Jane.54  Students 
rated the CEO named Jane negatively compared to their ratings of the CEO 
named John.55  The students’ reaction shows a clear gender stereotype that 
men are more competent business leaders than women.56  Another study, by 
Thomas-Hunt and Phillips, “suggests that women [in workgroups] are often 
penalized when they possess the same expertise that men have.” 57  
Additionally, although recent studies show that individuals with stellar 
interpersonal skills are more effective leaders, individuals who display 
stereotypically masculine leadership styles are more likely to be appointed to 
corporate leadership positions.58  
                                          
50  FRASER, supra note 39, at 162. 
51  Rhode & Packel, supra note 3, at 406; DHIR, supra note 10, at 50. 
52  Giscombe, supra note 36, at 391. 
53  Rhode & Packel, supra note 3, at 406. 
54  Id. at 407. 
55  Id. 
56  CREDIT SUISSE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, GENDER DIVERSITY AND CORPORATE PERFORMANCE 28 
(2012), http://www.calstrs.com/sites/main/files/file-attachments/csri_gender_diversity_and_corporate_per 
formance.pdf. 
57  DHIR, supra note 10, at 50 (citing Melissa C. Thomas-Hunt & Katherine W. Phillips, When What 
You Know Is Not Enough: Expertise and Gender Dynamics in Task Groups, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1585, 1594 (2004)). 
58  Giscombe, supra note 36, at 391. 
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 The androcentric ordering of gendered preference has remained a 
static element in the workplace despite the popularity of diversity as a 
supposed new priority. 59   The desirability of gender diversity affords 
advancement opportunities to a small percentage of women who happen to 
have characteristics that are closer to androcentric ideals.60  A few women 
achieve positions of power while most women remain in positions of 
relatively low pay, respect, and responsibility.61  Considering the fact that 
only 19% of board seats on corporate boards of U.S. public companies are 
filled by women, it is clear that the current emphasis on diversity is only 
benefitting a small percentage of women rather than creating real change in 
the institutions that are keeping women out of leadership positions.62  For 
over 40 years Title VII has mandated gender-integrated workplaces in the 
United States, but women continue to inhabit a markedly subordinate sphere 
in the workplace.63 
C. Lack of Access to Executive Level Experience Keeps Women Off 
of Boards 
As a result of in-group bias, entrenched androcentric values, and other 
conscious and unconscious biases, women are not getting opportunities to 
fill top leadership positions within corporations.  The most commonly stated 
reason for underrepresentation of women on corporate boards is that women 
lack leadership experience in the upper echelons of corporate management.64  
The typical qualifications desired in directors include financial expertise, 
executive-level industry experience, knowledge or training regarding 
corporate governance, and independence (non-affiliation with the 
corporation).65  Many public company boards consist mostly of current or 
retired CEOs of other public companies.66 
                                          
59  Render, supra note 12, at 90. 
60  Id. at 90–91. 
61  Id. at 91. 
62   2014 Catalyst Census, supra note 8. 
63  Id. at 77. 
64  Rhode & Packel, supra note 3, at 402. 
65  Burch, supra note 7, at 600. 
66  Butler, Financial Expert, supra note 6, at 31. 
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There are far fewer women in the ranks of executive-level corporate 
management, which makes it difficult for women to gain executive-level 
industry experience.67  Women in the United States graduate from college 
and professional programs at higher rates than men,68 but women make up 
only 3.5% of Fortune 1000 CEOs and 14.6% of Fortune 500 executive 
officers.69  Similarly, research in Europe shows that in many of the largest 
500 corporations, women are recruited in numbers that are comparable to 
their male counterparts, but women become increasingly underrepresented 
as they move higher up the organization.70 
Women may be given fewer opportunities to do high-profile projects 
in upper management because of stereotypical beliefs about women’s 
abilities and interests, such as the assumption that women do not want jobs 
or tasks that require “significant time away from the family.” 71   One 
example of this is that hiring committees often look for director candidates 
who have international experience.72  Because of the assumption that women 
with families find it more difficult than men with families to relocate or 
travel for extended periods, women are often not even considered for 
international assignments.73  Despite this persistent stereotype that women 
are not interested in ambitious projects that might require significant time 
away from the family, research shows that women in top management 
positions in the United States have ambition equal to that of their male 
counterparts.74  In a 2004 study by Catalyst of top management in Fortune 
500 companies, majorities of both women and men wanted to be CEO of an 
                                          
67  Id. 
68  Render, supra note 12, at 76 n.3 (statistics relating to gender of law school graduates and attorneys 
who make partner); Matt Egan, Still missing: Female business leaders, CNN MONEY (Mar. 24, 2015, 1:49 
PM ET), http://money.cnn.com/2015/03/24/investing/female-ceo-pipeline-leadership/. 
69  Rhode & Packel, supra note 3, at 403. 
70  MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 29, at 7. 
71  Giscombe, supra note 36, at 388, 391; see also MCKINSEY & CO., supra note 29, at 17. 
72  Boris Groysberg & Deborah Bell, Dysfunction in the Boardroom: Understanding the Persistent 
Gender Gap at the Highest Levels, HARV. BUS. REV., June 2013, at 88, 91. 
73  Id. 
74  Giscombe, supra note 36, at 386 (This finding is echoed in a more recent study of 1400 
international executives, in all major regions, which found that women’s aspirations to rise into top 
leadership positions are nearly equal to men’s. Just under 80% of women in top or middle management 
positions aspire to move up to top leadership positions while just over 80% of men do. See MCKINSEY & 
CO., supra note 24). 
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organization.75  Assumptions about women’s priorities and ambition, rather 
than women’s actual priorities and ambition, keep hiring committees from 
considering women for positions that could be key to advancing their careers 
to director level.  
Less diversity among senior executives leads to less diversity among 
potential board candidates where executive-level industry experience is 
often viewed as a prerequisite.76  One study of 1,000 corporate directors 
found that male directors more often define “qualified” as having prior 
executive-level experience.77  About half of male Fortune 500 directors are 
CEOs or former CEOs. 78   This standard is, however, seemingly more 
harshly applied to women.79  For instance, “vastly more men currently serve 
[as directors] without CEO experience.” 80   This shows that in order to 
become board members, women must attain a higher level of preparedness.  
That CEO experience is a “pre-requisite” to board service is much more true 
for women than men.  
D. The Business Case for Greater Gender Diversity On Boards Is 
Not Enough To Overcome Other Barriers 
The business case for gender diversity—that is, the correlation 
between gender diversity in leadership and positive corporate financial 
performance—is contested at best. 81   The slow growth of gender parity 
indicates that the business case alone is not enough to cause businesses to 
                                          
75  Id. 
76  Burch, supra note 7, at 600. 
77  DHIR, supra note 10, at 39. 
78  Rhode & Packel, supra note 3, at 402. 
79  CATALYST, THE “THINK DIRECTOR, THINK CEO” MYTH: FORTUNE 500 COMPANIES (2012), http:// 
www.catalyst.org/system/files/The_Think_Director_Think_CEO_Myth_Fortune_500_Companies.pdf. 
80  Id. In an ethnographic study of around 300 female directors and 100 male directors, 68% of 
women had CEO experience while only 51% of men did. Groysberg & Bell, supra note 72, at 90 (noting 
also that there are vastly more men than women serving as directors, which may partially account for the 
disparity). 
81  See generally Rhode & Packel, supra note 3; Susan Adams, Women On Boards: Slow Progress 
And Marginalization, Study Shows, FORBES (June 11, 2015, 1:57 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams/2015/06/11/women-on-boards-slow-progress-and-
marginalization-study-shows/#7c79f01b3745; James A. Fanto et al., Board Diversity and Corporate 
Performance: Filling in the Gaps: Justifying Board Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. 901 (2011); Lee, supra note 
11, at 1483–86. 
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adopt more gender inclusive selection processes for boards of directors.  It is 
hotly contested whether greater gender diversity on boards of directors will 
cause short or long-term benefits to corporations.     
Studies show variable results regarding whether increased numbers of 
women on boards increases profitability or not.  Some empirical evidence 
suggests that women are more financially risk averse than men and for that 
reason, commentators have speculated that the presence of at least one 
woman on a board leads to more accurate financial reporting and more 
prudent financial decision-making. 82   Other commentators speculate that 
board diversity is productive on boards because it generates cognitive 
conflict because the board members draw on a wide range of perspectives.83  
Some studies have shown a positive correlation between board diversity and 
other measures of good governance such as more board meetings, higher 
attendance rates, greater participation in decision making, tougher 
monitoring, and replacement of the CEO when the corporation’s stock 
performs poorly.84  Yet another study showed that boards with at least two 
women paid greater attention to audit and risk oversight than all-male 
boards.85 
The non-profit Catalyst, consulting company McKinsey & Co., and 
financial services company Credit Suisse produced influential research that 
makes the case that gender diversity in board leadership and management at 
least correlates with better company performance. 86   As with anything, 
however, correlations do not necessarily demonstrate causation and few 
                                          
82  Rhode & Packel, supra note 3, at 394. 
83  Id. at 395–96. 
84  Id. at 400; Fairfax, supra note 19, at 590. 
85  Rhode & Packel, supra note 3, at 400–01. 
86  CREDIT SUISSE RES. INST., supra note 56, at 6 (stating that Catalyst’s studies show that Fortune 
500 companies with more women on their boards tend to be more profitable and the McKinseys’ studies 
show that companies with a higher proportion of women on their boards exhibit a “higher degree of 
organization, above-average operating margins and higher valuations”). 
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studies have claimed to show that board diversity leads to better financial 
performance.87  
Empirical evidence on the issue of whether board diversity increases 
shareholder value is mixed. 88   Other studies assert that diversity in the 
boardroom can enhance a corporation’s bottom line by helping it reach out 
to a larger and more diverse base of customers, clients, and employees.89  
Catalyst’s 2004 study of 353 Fortune 500 companies found a link between 
high representations of women in management (defined as women corporate 
officers and top earners) and financial performance.90  Follow up studies by 
Catalyst for 2004 through 2008 found a similar link.91  Catalyst clearly states 
that its studies should not be taken to show a causal link. 92   
Despite a potential positive correlation between gender diversity and 
performance, studies, including the previously cited Credit Suisse report, 
show that there is no causation between greater gender diversity, 
profitability, and stock price performance.93  The authors of these studies 
hypothesize that the appointment of more women to a board is a signal that a 
corporation is already doing well.94  Some studies have claimed that better 
financial performance positions a corporation to attract a more diverse board, 
to devote more resources to recruiting diverse directors, or that a completely 
different factor could be causing the correlation.95  Increased diversity may 
cause boards to be less cohesive and less efficient.96  Some studies have also 
shown that without a critical mass of women on a board of directors, the 
women who are present may not express their diverse viewpoints.97  These 
                                          
87  Rhode & Packel, supra note 3, at 387; see also CREDIT SUISSE RES. INST., supra note 56, at 3 
(stating that “it is difficult to demonstrate definitive proof” that gender diversity within corporate 
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88  Rhode & Packel, supra note 3, at 383. 
89  Fairfax, supra note 19, at 591. 
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93  CREDIT SUISSE RES. INST., supra note 56, at 6. 
94  Id. 
95  Rhode & Packel, supra note 3, at 387; DHIR, supra note 10, at 64. 
96  Fairfax, supra note 19, at 592. 
97  Id. at 593. 
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studies show that is also possible that any added value from diversity on 
boards depends on the extent or balance of diverse representation.98  Mere 
presence of diverse voices on boards without efforts to include them in 
decision-making may prove fruitless, for example.99 
Scholarship on business law is often divided into two camps: law and 
economics scholars who prioritize efficiency in the marketplace and scholars 
from a variety of other perspectives that prioritize justice.100  Both of these 
groups seem to recognize that there is a trade-off between efficiency and 
fairness when it comes to incorporating more gender diversity into corporate 
boards.101  Because this trade-off exists, it is hard to make the case for 
diversity in the context of publicly traded corporations where short-term 
returns matter a lot and diversity initiatives often promise short-term cost for 
long-term payoffs.102 
III. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO INCREASE CORPORATE BOARD 
GENDER DIVERSITY: WEAK INTERVENTION MODEL 
In the United States, public corporations are governed by statutes and 
regulations at both the state and federal level, which disperses the 
government’s regulatory power over corporations among multiple policy 
making bodies. 103  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
made an attempt at implementing regulations to address diversity in the 
                                          
98  DHIR, supra note 10, at 63. 
99  Id. 
100  Barbara Ann White, Economic Efficiency and the Parameters of Fairness: A Marriage of 
Marketplace Morals and the Ethic of Care, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (2005). 
101  Id. 
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workplace, but such efforts amount to weak and ultimately ineffectual 
intervention.  
Whether and how the United States government should intervene to 
promote diversity in the workplace is influenced somewhat, by the 
sensibility of the body politic.  For a time leading up to the 1980s, there was 
strong political momentum in support of government intervention in the 
private sector to prevent discrimination.104  In the 1980s, a “conservative 
political philosophy” took hold in the United States, which elevated the 
“autonomy and privacy dimensions of individual freedom.”105  This shift in 
philosophy emphasized the “autonomy interest” of possible discriminators 
against the “public value of repairing class-based distributive inequities.”106  
A study of American law review discourse over a recent twenty-five-year 
period shows that legal scholars discussed “command-and-control” 
regulatory power as “coercive,” “legalistic,” “uniform,” “costly,” and 
“ineffective.” 107   In the words of one legal scholar, “Bashing traditional 
regulation has become something of a national pastime among legal 
scholars.”108 
 Despite the anti-regulation turn taken in American political sentiment, 
American corporations are subject to both state and federal laws and 
regulations.  The foundational duties of corporate directors are established 
under state law.109  For instance, the Corporation Law of Delaware requires 
that the “business affairs of every corporation [ . . . ] shall be managed by or 
under the direction of a board of directors.”110  Furthermore, the directors 
owe duties of care, loyalty, and good faith to the corporation’s 
shareholders.111  The board of directors plans the direction of the company 
                                          
104  Render, supra note 12, at 106. 
105  Id. 
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and monitors and evaluates senior management’s implementation of the 
business plan.112  
A. Role of Securities and Exchange Commission 
 Corporations are subject to federal anti-trust and securities laws that 
seek to protect consumers and investors.  President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
established the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a federal 
agency in response to the great stock market crash of 1929 that led to the 
Great Depression.113  The SEC oversees the securities industry and enforces 
the securities laws that Congress enacts.114  The SEC’s mission is to protect 
investors; to sustain fair, orderly, and efficient capital markets; and to 
facilitate capital formation. 115   The federal securities laws impose an 
elaborate system of mandatory disclosure rules and periodic reporting 
rules.116  
The goal of disclosure-based systems is to help investors manage 
risk117 by facilitating “informed investment decisions” and efficient capital 
markets. 118   Despite a broad statutory grant of power, the SEC has 
sometimes interpreted its mandate narrowly. 119   To effectuate informed 
investing, the federal securities laws require publicly traded firms to report 
to the SEC on a wide range of internal governance and financial matters 
quarterly and annually.120  Additionally, public companies must submit an 
annual report containing audited financial statements and other information 
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to shareholders in connection with the corporation’s annual proxy 
solicitation.121  
When Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act in 2010, it signaled that stronger substantive 
regulation of public companies and the financial markets might be in 
store.122  The Dodd-Frank Act created the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau, required regulation of derivative markets, and created a council of 
federal regulators led by the Treasury Secretary.123  However, Congress’s 
appetite for strong intervention was short-lived.124  In fact, since the Dodd-
Frank moment in 2010, Congress has shifted back to a disclosure-based 
governance model, enacting disclosure requirements in 2011 and 2012 on 
topics such as use of “conflict minerals” from the Republic of Congo in a 
corporation’s products; corporate mine operators’ health and safety 
violations; and corporate activities related to Iran.125  In all of these cases, 
the laws require no substantive change in corporate behavior, but rather 
attempt to effectuate a change in behavior indirectly.126   
Similarly, the SEC and other federal agencies continue to intervene 
indirectly rather than directly in corporate governance matters.127  Through 
its federal enforcement authority, the SEC effectuates corporate governance 
changes through the issuance of reports of investigations, and settled 
enforcement actions.128  Additionally, the SEC has powerful regulatory tools 
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at its disposal.  For instance, the SEC can impose monetary civil penalties 
for securities law violations.129  The SEC also has the power to issue a “stop 
order” that suspends a corporation’s registration statement and suspends 
trading in a security for up to ten days.130  This remedy is available when the 
SEC believes that the “public interest and the protection of investors so 
require.” 131   Finally, the SEC can subject corporations to disciplinary 
sanctions, including suspension and revocation of registration, for failure to 
follow requirements.132  
B. The SEC’s Diversity Disclosure Rule: A Weak Intervention 
In the United States, women make up 16% of corporate boards and 
roughly 14% of corporate executives.133  The SEC, recognizing that gender 
imbalance on boards is a continuing problem, enacted a disclosure-based 
diversity initiative in 2009. 134   The Proxy Disclosure Enhancements 
Regulation (diversity disclosure rule), which took effect on February 28, 
2010, 135  requires companies to disclose “whether, and if so, how the 
nominating committee (or the board) considers diversity in identifying 
nominees for director.”136  Furthermore, the company is supposed to disclose 
how the diversity policy is implemented and how the board assesses the 
effectiveness of the policy.137  As a result, a board of directors that does 
consider diversity in its hiring process must also identify how they consider 
diversity in identifying candidates.138  Prior to 2010, the SEC did not require 
publicly traded companies to collect or report any information regarding 
diversity.139  The stated purpose of the new diversity disclosure rule was to 
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“enhance the information provided in annual reports and proxy information 
statements to better enable shareholders to evaluate the leadership of public 
companies.”140 
The law has two serious loopholes.  First, while disclosure is 
mandatory, companies are not required to have a diversity policy, and those 
that do not have a diversity policy merely disclose that they do not have a 
policy in place.141  As discussed below, this does not follow the letter or 
spirit of the law because companies are supposed to disclose more than the 
mere existence or non-existence of a diversity policy.  Second, companies 
are allowed to define diversity “in ways that they consider to be 
appropriate.”142  Since the diversity disclosure rule does not require boards 
to disclose board diversity by race, gender, or any other identifying 
characteristic, the rule has not served to provide investors with meaningful 
information.143  
C. Diversity Disclosure Rule Compliance and Outcome 
While comply-or-explain disclosure approaches may seem more 
politically palatable than mandatory quotas, their effectiveness is 
questionable. 144   Comply-or-explain approaches represent a form of 
decentralized “new governance regulation” wherein the state does not serve 
as the sole or primary regulator.145  The state, in such instances, forms one 
part of a pluralistic regulatory environment where the regulated entity itself, 
alongside other non-state actors, contributes to the formation of norms and 
expectations.146 
Many believed that the diversity disclosure rule, which took effect in 
2010, would cause companies to add women and other minorities to their 
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boards of directors, but no such change took place. 147   Fortune 500 
corporation proxies from 2012 show that women held an average of 16.6% 
of board seats on Fortune 500 company boards. 148   This represents an 
increase of less than 2% from 2009, the year immediately preceding the 
implementation of the SEC’s diversity disclosure rules.149  Growth of gender 
diversity on boards stagnated even under the diversity disclosure rule that 
the SEC thought would spur change.150 
A study of Fortune 50 proxy statements from 2012 showed that many 
companies did not fully comply with the disclosure rule.  Notably, over 60% 
of companies in the Fortune 50 category failed to comply with the diversity 
disclosure rule because they failed to disclose some or all of the required 
information.151  About 10% of Fortune 50 companies completely failed to 
mention “diversity” in their 2012 proxy.152  About 12.5% of Fortune 50 
companies merely included a statement as to whether “diversity” was 
considered in their board selection process (6 yes, 1 no).153  About half of 
Fortune 50 companies included a statement about whether and how they 
considered diversity in board nominations, but they did not include any 
information about how they implement their diversity policy or assess its 
success.154  Only about 25% of Fortune 50 companies fully complied with 
the SEC diversity disclosure requirements in their 2012 proxy statements.155 
Some companies bypass the diversity disclosure requirement 
altogether by including a simple statement that the company does not have a 
fixed policy with regard to seeking diversity among board candidates.156  
However, the SEC’s rule does not differentiate between formal or informal 
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policies but rather requires disclosure of any considerations of diversity that 
are part of the board nominating process. 157   Companies use the words 
“formal” and “specific” in proxies to reject the existence of an official 
diversity policy and to justify the company’s failure to elaborate further.158  
Even the SEC Commissioner, Luis Aguilar, has underscored the weaknesses 
in the current disclosure system, including a lack of compliance by many 
companies.159  
 Allowing companies to define diversity themselves leads to 
superficial and uninformative diversity disclosures.160  In 2012, only 43% of 
the Fortune 50 companies’ proxy statements mentioned “gender” in their 
descriptions of diversity.161  Since the SEC has provided no guidelines for 
defining diversity, companies have developed their own criteria.  For 
instance, IBM’s 2012 proxy statement says that the board and hiring 
committee “focus on ensuring that the Board reflects a diversity of 
experiences, backgrounds and individuals . . . The Committee recommends 
candidates based on their business or professional experience, the diversity 
of their background, and their talents and perspectives.”162  Ford’s diversity 
statement is similar, mentioning diversity of “experience in business, 
government, education and technology, and in areas that are relevant to the 
company’s global activities.”163  
Ultimately, these vague, abstract, or misleading diversity statements 
are unhelpful to shareholders who wish to evaluate whether companies are 
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implementing policies to improve gender diversity.164  Most companies do 
not comply with the current diversity disclosure rule, but even when they do, 
the disclosures they make are not always helpful.  Furthermore, when 
companies do not comply with the disclosure requirements, the SEC does 
not enforce the rule.165 
Without a strong mandate from Congress, the SEC is unlikely to 
enforce or strengthen its promotion or regulation of diversity on corporate 
boards.  Within a regulatory regime that is designed to protect investors from 
financial risk or fraud, lack of diversity on boards will remain a low priority 
unless and until it is shown that a lack of diversity causes a financial risk.  
IV. NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION TO INCREASE CORPORATE 
BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY: RADICAL INTERVENTION MODEL 
Norway was a global trendsetter in 2003 when it became the first 
developed country to enact a gender quota law applicable to corporate 
boards of directors of public companies. 166   The quota policy affected 
approximately 500 public limited liability companies and publicly owned 
enterprises and dramatically changed the gender balance on Norwegian 
corporate boards.167 
A. Overview of Norwegian Corporate Law 
Norwegian corporate law requires the board of directors to fulfill both 
management and supervisory duties.168  The Norwegian Limited Liabilities 
Companies Act (The Norwegian Act) applies to all public limited liability 
companies, which are known as allmennaksjeselskap, or ASA firms, and sets 
out the basic governance and structural requirements for such firms.169  The 
Norwegian Act applies only to public limited liability companies, so 
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privately held companies are not subject to its requirements. 170   The 
Norwegian Act specifies that management responsibilities be assigned to a 
“general manager,” a CEO, who cannot be a member of the board and must 
follow the board’s direction.171  The “general manager” CEO appoints the 
rest of the high-level management.172 
B. Norway’s Radical Intervention in Board Diversity: The Quota 
In general, the quota law, which is found in the Section 6-11a of the 
Norwegian Act, requires 40% representation of the minority gender on the 
boards of registered public limited liability companies.173  The quota law 
evolved to its current form in three distinct phases.  First, under a 
government-industry agreement, compliance with the 40% quota was 
voluntary during the two-year period beginning January 1, 2004 and ending 
December 31, 2005.174  Under the agreement, if the businesses in the private 
sector reached the desired gender representation goals by July 1, 2005, the 
mandatory quota law would not take effect.175  A Statistics Norway survey 
showed that at the time the deadline passed, only about 13% of ASA 
companies had complied with the voluntary quota and only 16% of 
Norwegian directors were women.176 
Because of this low compliance rate, the rules mandating a 40% 
gender quota on boards took effect for public limited liability companies on 
January 1, 2006.177  This change marked the beginning of the second phase 
of the quota law.  Companies were given a two-year period from January 1, 
2006 to December 31, 2007 to comply with the 40% required quota.178  
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During the transition phase, any new companies seeking to register as public 
companies would have to comply fully with the 40% quota in order to be 
registered.179  As of December 2007, women held 37% of board seats in 
Norway, up from 6% in 2001 before the law took effect.180  
The third phase of implementation began on January 1, 2008 when the 
quota officially took effect.181  In its final form, the law requires: 
 
On the board of directors of public limited liability companies, 
both sexes shall be represented in the following manner:  
1. If the board of directors has two or three members, both 
sexes shall be represented. 
2. If the board of directors has four or five members, each sex 
shall be represented by at least two members.  
3. If the board of directors has six to eight members, each sex 
shall be represented by at least three members.  
4. If the board of directors has nine members, each sex shall be 
represented by at least four members, and if the board of 
directors has more members, each sex shall represent at least 
50 percent of the members of the board.182  
 
The law officially requires 33 to 50 percent representation of the minority 
gender depending on the size of the board of directors.  The law protects 
either women or men as the “minority gender” and requires fairly balanced 
representation of both genders.  As of January 1, 2008, any ASA company 
that did not comply with the law faced dissolution under the normal 
enforcement rules provided by The Norwegian Act.183   
C. Diversity Quota Rule Compliance and Outcome 
The cost of non-compliance with the Norwegian gender quota law is 
high.  The Norwegian Act provides for dissolution of a public company by 
decree of the court if the company “has not reported to the Register of 
Business Enterprises a board of directors which satisfies the requirements of 
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provisions issued in or pursuant to statute.” 184   If a company does not 
comply with the board requirements, the company is given notice and a 
period of one month to remedy the problem.185  If after one month, the 
company has not met the gender quota, the government issues a second 
notice, this time publicly in the Brønnøysund Register Center’s electronic 
bulletin for public announcements.186  The announcement will state that “the 
conditions for dissolving the company are satisfied, and that the company is 
allowed a period of four weeks from the electronic announcement to remedy 
the matter.”187  Once notice to the company has been announced as required, 
if the company exceeds the four-week period after the announcement, the 
Register of Business Enterprises must notify the District Court that the 
company is non-compliant; thereafter, the court must “without additional 
notice decide by decree to dissolve the company.”188  Once the court decides 
to dissolve the company, the company must be liquidated in accordance with 
the Bankruptcy Act and the Creditors Recovery Act.189 
One unintended outcome of the quota law was that a portion of public 
companies chose to delist.  Quotas are a “command-and-control” type of 
regulation that require a hierarchical relationship between the regulator and 
the regulated.190  Some companies opted out of that hierarchical relationship 
and sought other avenues to profitability. 191   In fact, up to 40% of 
Norwegian publicly traded businesses avoided the quota law by converting 
to private limited companies. 192   Two-thirds of companies that chose to 
delist indicated that the quota rules were behind the decision.193 
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While delisting was an unfortunate choice that some public companies 
made to avoid the new law, much of the scholarship on the law shows that it 
has become widely accepted within operating public ASA companies.  On 
the individual level, in a qualitative study of 23 Norwegian company 
directors covering both men and women of varying experience levels, 
researcher Aaron Dhir found that while two-thirds of those interviewed were 
opposed to or indifferent to the law initially, after seeing the quota law in 
action and experiencing its effects they came to endorse it.194  The study also 
showed that directors who might have initially opposed the law because of a 
general dislike of “governmental meddling in the private sphere” might 
come to support the law “as a necessary evil in disrupting the closed 
networks that had previously dominated boardrooms.”195  Norwegian firms 
have been forced to broaden their director searches beyond “friends 
recruiting friends into the boardrooms.” 196   In supporting the mandatory 
quota, some respondents in the Dhir study indicated that, without it, 
recruitment based on personal ties and similar backgrounds or characteristics 
would continue. 197   It appears that the quota law has been effective at 
combatting in-group bias that is a strong factor in keeping women out of the 
boardroom.  Also of great significance is that the quota law has not had the 
drastic negative financial impact that many predicted.198   
D. The Equality Case for Gender Diversity On Boards 
The quota law has, however, “arguably had broader social effects by 
redistributing power in Norwegian society.”  Before the passage of the quota 
law, Norway was much like the U.S. in that more women were participating 
in higher education than men and yet at least 50% of publicly held 
companies had no women on their boards. 199   That important power 
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dynamics are at stake is reflected in the fact that many firms did not comply 
when the quota was voluntary.”200 
In an official government publication intended to outline the purpose 
and principles behind the Norwegian gender balance policy, the official 
government position was that, “reaching a balanced participation is a 
question of democracy.” 201   In an official publication, the Norwegian 
government further clarified:  
The Government regards the legislation on women in boards as 
an important step towards equality between the sexes, a fairer 
society and a more even distribution of power, and as an 
important factor in the creation of wealth in society.  The 
legislation will secure women’s influence on decision making 
processes of great importance for the economy in the society.  It 
is important to make use of all the human resources in our 
country, not just half of [them].”202 
The acceptance of the quota law may be a reflection of Norway’s 
political culture and commitment to egalitarianism. 203   Commitment to 
egalitarianism is demonstrated in both public and private policies.204  For 
instance, a number of Norway’s influential political parties adopted 40% 
party gender quotas as early as the 1970s.205  In part because of the voluntary 
gender quotas undertaken by Norway’s political parties, Norway’s level of 
women’s political participation consistently ranks near the highest in the 
world.206  Additionally, Norway has a gender-equal national kindergarten 
plan, which mandates that all children have equal opportunity to be seen and 
heard and to participate fully in all activities.207  The focus on Norway’s 
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national policies is not simply on improving the status of women, but rather 
on achieving gender equality in general.208 
Additionally, unlike the United States, Norway is a signatory of the 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW). 209   The quota law in Norway represents Norway’s 
respect for CEDAW,210 which states that men and women shall have the 
right to “the same employment opportunities . . . promotion . . . and equal 
treatment in respect of work of equal value.”211  The quota law “aims to 
enforce greater levels of gender equality in the fields of family life, private 
work, public work, and politics to enforce gender balance in economic 
stewardship.”212 
Furthermore, in the private sector in Norway, corporate culture tends 
to be “open and nonhierarchical as well as encouraging of parental leave, 
flex policies, and work-from-home policies.”213  The egalitarian effect of 
workplace parental leave policies is bolstered by the government sponsored 
paid parental leave policy, which “requires that the father take a specific 
number of weeks (ten) and the mother take an equal amount.”214  After that, 
the parents may divide the rest of the paid leave period as they choose.215  
The official purpose of the “paternal quota” is “to encourage fathers to 
participate more in caring for their infant.”216  Norwegian men actually rank 
second only after Danish men in the amount of time they spend performing 
unpaid work in the home, such as housekeeping and caring for children.217 
Boards achieve diversity-related outcomes when a critical mass of 
women, as required by the quota law, serve as directors together.218  The 
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quota law in Norway is an attempt to regulate gender inequality by 
intervening in the market.219  
V. ANALYSIS 
In the history of the modern economy, women have not had a seat at 
the boardroom table.  Around the globe, momentum has been growing for 
gender diversity and female representation on boards, but the pace of change 
has been slow.  Research shows that myriad intractable, inaccurate 
assumptions and entrenched gender stereotypes may be a primary cause of 
the lack of women in corporate leadership.  Although business leaders and 
investors have become aware of the issue and mostly agreed—at least 
publicly—that more women must be incorporated into the higher ranks of 
corporate leadership, the slow pace of change shows that more thought must 
be given to why and how such change will occur.  
When we look to Norway, we see that an efficient model for change 
exists, one that utilizes radical regulatory intervention as a catalyst for 
change.  In less than a decade, Norway transformed its corporate boards 
from the embodiment of entrenched gender hierarchy to a model of gender 
integration.  The outcome in Norway has been largely positive as directors’ 
experience of the change has helped to dispel some of the entrenched 
stereotypical thinking about women’s career ambitions and abilities. 
In the United States, where regulatory intervention in the private 
business sector typically requires economic justifications, the business case 
for diversity is not providing adequate motivation for strong intervention.  
Similarly, leaders in the business community publicly exalt diversity in the 
workplace, but in evaluating their bottom line, many de-prioritize gender 
diversity initiatives in favor of other programs in hopes of generating 
shorter-term financial gains.  As former Kodak CEO, Antonio Perez bluntly 
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put it: “the real barrier . . . [is that] corporations don't believe that [diversity] 
is a business imperative.”220 
The Norwegian experience teaches us important lessons.  First, other 
policies and programs to promote gender equality formed a foundation for 
Norway’s rapid transition to near gender equality on boards.  Second, 
incorporating large numbers of women onto Norway’s boards of directors 
did not reap financial disaster.   
Advocates for gender parity on boards of directors in the United 
States should advocate for policies and programs that will normalize gender 
equality.  For example, advocates for equality should petition their 
representatives in state and federal legislative bodies to enact paid parental 
leave for mothers and fathers.  The existence of required paid parental leave 
for both mothers and fathers in Norway was noted by scholars and business-
people alike as laying a foundation for gender equality in the workplace.  
The requirement for both parents to take time off to parent an infant shifted 
the burden of parenting so that it was more shared between men and women.  
The U.S. currently does not have any mandated paid maternity or paternity 
leave, but advocates for gender equality should consider the Norway model 
when advocating for paid parental leave in the United States.  Implementing 
leave policies that are mandated for or at least inclusive of both genders will 
help change attitudes about women’s roles within the workplace and family.  
Furthermore, a number of Norway’s political parties adopted 
voluntary 40% gender quotas over the last 40 years.  While corporations 
may ultimately cling to the business rationale, our political organizations are 
not beholden to such measures.  In fact, they are charged with the important 
work of representing the populace as a whole.  Developing avenues for 
women to flourish in high-powered leadership roles will help lay the 
foundation for more gender diversity on corporate boards.  Those who wish 
to see change in the gender balance within the leadership at the highest 
echelons of the corporate world should promote gender parity in political 
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leadership—another important area where women’s actual performance can 
begin to tear down the stereotypes about women’s leadership abilities.  
Leaders within the corporate world hold a lot of power over this issue, 
and while change at the director level may seem risky and costly, 
corporations could make changes to internal policies to great effect.  For 
example, it is time for corporations to divert energy and resources from 
diversity recruitment, which most are succeeding at, to diverse and inclusive 
promotion and retention policies.  Most large corporations succeed at 
recruiting women into entry-level positions, but they fail at promotion and 
retention of women because their internal policies regarding assignment of 
work, evaluations, and parental leave continue to embed androcentric values 
and gender stereotypes that devalue women and women’s work.  Employees 
at all levels should demand these changes.  
 By working for governmental and workplace policy changes on a 
number of fronts, advocates for gender equality on boards can lay the 
framework for more radical change.  Advocates can increase the rate of 
change and create more opportunities for the advancement of women onto 
boards of directors in the United States. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
While a quota law is not a palatable solution in the U.S., advocates 
could work to change the discourse around diversity on boards of directors.  
Working to implement more gender equality policies in less controversial 
ways will help to set a strong foundation for firmer regulatory intervention 
on the subject of gender diversity on boards of directors in U.S. public 
companies.  
 
